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inception, intended to attack the specific party suing. The gist of civil recovery is damage, the conspiracy usually being important only to give additional rights against persons who, though inactive, nevertheless participated in the common design. *Hutchins v. Hutchins*, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 104; *Robertson v. Parks*, 76 Md. 118. So the plaintiff may fail to prove the conspiracy, yet recover against any defendants who actually caused the injury. *Doremus v. Hennessy*, 62 Ill. App. 391. On this principle the present plaintiff should have recovered at least from those who discriminated. But under the New York statute, this combination is a criminal conspiracy. N. Y. PENAL CODE, § 168, subd. 6; *People v. Sheldon*, 139 N. Y. 251. When an injury has been caused by the carrying out of criminal designs, it should be no excuse that the acts originated from another purpose. The principal case, therefore, seems wrong in giving heed to the specific intent where an illegal combination was the proximate cause of the injury.

WITNESSES — COMPETENCY — COMPETENCY OF WITNESS CONVICTED IN ANOTHER STATE TO TESTIFY. — A Missouri statute declared that persons convicted of certain specified crimes should be incompetent to be sworn as witnesses. In a criminal suit a witness convicted of such a crime in Indiana testified under objection. *Held*, that his testimony was properly admitted in Missouri. *State v. Landrum*, 106 S. W. 1111 (Mo., K. C. Ct. App.).

The civil law regarded infamy as a status governed by the law of the convict's domicile. 2 BOULLENOIS, obs. 32. This view, with its incident of incapacity to testify elsewhere, was not adopted by the common law. STORY, CONF. OF L., 8 ed., §§ 91, 92. Nor does the constitutional requirement that judgments of the several states be given full faith and credit give rise to an extraterritorial incapacity; it refers only to the conclusiveness of the fact for which a judgment stands. *Com. v. Green*, 17 Mass. 515. The question then is, does the local law of a state render one convicted in another state incompetent to testify? It has been held that it does, provided the other state's law corresponds with that of the former. *Chase v. Blodgett*, 10 N. H. 22. But the better of the scanty authority, either at common law or under statutes substantially declaratory, gives no effect at home to foreign convictions, whatever their effect there. *Sims v. Sims*, 75 N. Y. 466; *contra*, *State v. Candler*, 3 Hawks (N. C.) 393. This result is justified in view of the varying attitudes of different states toward the same crimes, and the possible untrustworthiness of one convicted of crime abroad is sufficiently guarded against by admitting the fact of conviction on the question of his credibility.

BOOKS AND PERIODICALS.

I. LEADING LEGAL ARTICLES.

GOVERNMENTAL POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT OVER NEWLY ACQUIRED TERRITORY. — By the treaty of Feb. 26, 1904, with the Republic of Panama the United States acquired in perpetuity the use of a strip of land ten miles wide, running across the isthmus, which is commonly known as the Canal Zone. The Fifty-eighth Congress, then in session, voted by a resolution of April 28, 1904, that until the expiration of that session, or unless provision for a temporary government should be sooner made, all powers of government should be vested in the President, or in such persons as he should appoint. The Sixtieth Congress is now in session. On March 19th Representative Harrison of New York said that since the expiration of the Fifty-eighth Congress no further provision had been made for the government of the Canal Zone; that since that time the President had had authority to act only as the executive of a *de facto* govern-